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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
DARWIN A. MECHAM, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRIORITY 2 
Case # 20010757-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Final Judgement and Commitment in the Eighth Judicial District 
Court, Duchesne, County, for jury convictions of one count of Operation of a Clandestine 
Laboratory, a First Degree Felony and one count of Absconding, a Third Degree Felony, 
sentenced concurrently before the Honorable Judge A. Lynn Payne, on August 22, 2001. 
A jury convicted Mr. Mecham of each count after a two day jury trial. Mr. Mecham 
waived his right to be sentenced a later date and requested that the Court impose sentence the day 
of his conviction. Judge Payne imposed concurrent time for both convictions and sentenced Mr. 
Mecham to prison on an indeterminate term of not less than five years and up to life for the 
convictions. 
This appeal is filed pursuant to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This 
Court has jurisdiction to review the conviction pursuant to §58-37-8(2)(a)(i)and Rule 3(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code 78-3a-909 (1996). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The trial Court committed plain error when it allowed the jury on two separate occasions 
to view Mr. Mecham in handcuffs. The trial attorney nor the trial Court addressed the issue 
below. This Court may only address the issue under the Plain Error standard. "To succeed on a 
claim of plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing '(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful'". quoting State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutions, statutory provisions, or rules referenced in this brief and 
pertinent to the issues now before the court on appeal are contained herein or attached to this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Darwin Mecham was charged on October 5, 2000 in Duchesne County with one count of 
Possession of a Clandestine Laboratory, Precursors and/or Equipment, a First Degree Felony 
violation of U.C.A. 58-37d-4 & 5 (Record OQ Appeal, Docket Entry #5). On October 10, 2000 
the Information was amended to add a second count, Absconding, a Third Degree Felony 
violation of U.C.A. 76-8-309.5. (R. 6-7). 
A second Amended Information was filed on May 7, 2001 to reflect the dates Mr. 
Mecham had failed to report to Adult Probation and Parole (R. 38). 
A preliminary hearing was held on July 2, 2001, in which the prosecution put on two 
witnesses, Teiko Munson and Adult Probation and Parole Officer Brad Draper who testified 
about Mr. Mecham's involvement with the lab equipment and his status on parole (R. 22-24). 
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Mr. Mecham was bound over for trial on both counts. 
A hearing was held on May 7, 2001, in which the trial court requested briefs be filed by 
both parties for purposes of the attempted suppression of Mr. Mecham5 s confession to law 
enforcement officers. (R. 44). Although the trial Court ruled that Mr. Mecham's confession was 
inadmissible at trial, he allowed into evidence the clandestine laboratory equipment found in the 
shed. The State alleged that Mr. Mecham either had standing to give consent to search to the 
shed (which they alleged had happened) or if as Mr. Mecham alleged, had no ownership in the 
property then he had no standing to contest the warrant less search of the shed in which the 
clandestine laboratory was found. The trial Court issued no written findings and no docket entry 
was filed related to the court's order. However, the laboratory equipment was admitted as 
evidence into trial 
The trial was held on August 21 & 22, 2001. The jury convicted Mr. Mecham of the 
Possession of the Clandestine Laboratory and Absconding (R. 185-192). Mr. Mecham waived 
time for sentencing and immediately requested to be sentenced. The trial judge sentenced Mr. 
Mecham to prison (R. 193-194). 
Mr. Mecham wrote a letter to the court and asked to appeal on the basis that he believed 
he had inadequate time to prepare for trial as his second place trial setting was bumped up and 
that the jury saw him twice during the trial in handcuffs (R. 197). 
Mr. Mecham's trial attorney, Karen Allen, filed a Notice of Appeal on September 10, 
2001 (R. 199). Karen Allen then requested that she be allowed to withdraw as appellate counsel 
and the court appoint an attorney to pursue the appeal. The trial Court requested that Julie 
George review the file and pursue viable issues for appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Teiko Munson, resident of Roosevelt had a lien or financial interest in a fifth wheel trailer 
that was owned by Charlie Garret (Trial Transcript, Page 12, 21). Ms. Munson had loaned 
money to Mr. Garret and in return had taken a pawn ticket or lien interest in the fifth wheel 
trailer. Ms. Munson had heard rumors in town that the trailer was falling into disrepair and she 
drove out to the property the trailer was sitting on to see for herself what condition it was in (T. 
13, 14, 21). When Ms. Munson got out to the trailer she found Darwin Mecham and a thirteen-
year old in the trailer. Ms. Munson told them they had no right to be there and to leave. Mr. 
Mecham agreed to leave but asked for a ride to another place to get his friend to come help him 
gather up belongings (T. 18). Ms. Munson drove him to Richard Potter's property. They had 
Mr. Potter follow them to the fifth wheel trailer remove items from the garage and shed next to 
the trailer. Potter, Mecham and the young girl loaded up stuff from the trailer, the garage and the 
shed (T. 15). They loaded up the car driven by Potter and they left the property. 
Ms. Munson was concerned about the poor living conditions of the property, the 
condition of the young girl and she went to the police. Ms. Munson described the items she saw 
Potter take from the garage and shed as meth equipment and odor associated with 
methamphetamine manufacturing (T. 19). Ms. Munson told the police about her suspicions and 
the police recognized Mr. Mecham as being on probation and having a warrant out for his arrest 
for absconding from supervision of his Adult Probation and Parole Officer, Brad Draper. 
Ammon Manning, a deputy with the Duchesne County Sheriffs Office was dispatched 
along with Chief Gurr to the fifth wheel trailer on the tip that Mr. Mecham was there. Shortly 
thereafter Mr. Mecham's probation officer, Brad Draper arrived (T. 46). Brad Draper was 
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notified by Chief Gurr that they had Mr Mecham in custody and that there was a meth lab on the 
property and for Draper to come assist (T 60) When Draper arrived he saw Darwin Mecham in 
handcuffs and a man named Richard Mecham in handcuffs He could smell the odor of the meth 
lab coming from the garage next to the fifth wheel trailer (T 61) Draper testified that Mecham 
told him that he had already told the police officers there that night that he had helped Richie 
Potter move the lab earlier that day and that Richard Mecham had come to help to cook the meth 
(T 63-64) 
Draper testified that Darwin Mecham got up and went to the garage to turn on a light 
The light was supposedly a signal to the other meth cooks to come to the garage to finish the 
meth cooking If the light was not on then the cooks would not come (T 65, 66) The police 
followed Darwin Mecham into the garage, saw the meth lab in plain view, took a photograph and 
retreated to call the drug team to come dismantle the lab and to go get a warrant (T 67) 
Draper asked Darwin Mecham if he had permission to go into the garage and he said yes 
(T 64, 65,72) Darwin Mecham was the person who opened the door to the garage and went 
inside and turned on the light Steve Hooley, a Roosevelt City Police officer was the officer who 
entered the garage with Draper and Mr Mecham and took the photographs (T 77-80) 
Vernal Police Officer Bob Taylor testified that he interviewed Richard Potter and Mr 
Potter denied that he owned the lab but stated that he owned the garage and shed was allowing 
Richard Mecham to use the garage to cook the meth (T 111-112) 
Wally Hendricks, a Duchesne County Sheriffs Deputy testified that he dusted the lab 
items for fingerprints and that he identified a partial thumb print of Mr Darwin Mecham5 s on a 
glass that was boxed up with the lab equipment (T 142-148) 
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Officer Kelly Kramer, a member of the DEA Metro Narcotics Task Force (T 115-
119),Officer Jeff Payne from the Drug Enforcement Administration (T. 28-42), Barbara Hopkins 
from the State Crime Lab (T. 128-138), Kim Kavanagh from the State Narcotics Unit (T. 119-
126, 139-141) all testified about the items seized from the garage, their use in a clandestine 
laboratory and their testing for methamphetamine precursor chemicals. Their testimony is not 
challenged in this brief Mr. Mecham does not dispute there was a lab in the garage only that he 
had anything to do with it other than carry it to Richard Potter's car. 
The Defense put on Richard Mecham, no relation to Darwin Mecham, who testified that 
the clandestine laboratory equipment belonged to him. Richard Mecham stored the lab in the 
garage and shed that belonged to Richard Potter (T. 12-15). Richard Mecham testified that he 
had the lab and in September he wanted to store the lab. A friend of Darwin Mecham told him 
that he could lock up some stuff in the garage near the fifth wheel trailer so Richard took the lab 
over and locked it up (T. 16-19). Richard Mecham went to the garage the night Darwin was 
arrested with the intent to get his lab and move it (T. 19). 
Darwin Mecham testified that the fifth wheel trailer belonged to Charlie Buren. Darwin 
was there in the trailer to fix it up. He was putting on a new roof and new floor covering. 
Darwin was at the trailer the day of his arrest working on the trailer. Charlie dropped him off and 
was coming back to get him. When Teiko Munson arrived and told him to leave he had her take 
him to Richard Potter's house (T.20-25). Darwin Mecham packed up his personal belongings 
that he had out there and when he and Richard Potter were leaving they passed Charlie who told 
them to go back up to the trailer. Charlie told them no one had a right to the trailer and Darwin 
should go back up and finish working (T. 24-25). 
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Darwin testified that he suspected Charlie's friends may have a lab stored up there but that 
he did not see it up and operating nor did he cook methamphetamine (T. 25-26). Darwin testified 
that he did not know for sure that a meth lab was in the shed. He said that he never told Brad 
Draper that there was a lab operating in the garage or that the light had to be on for Richard 
Potter or Richard Mecham to come to the garage to cook meth (T. 32-41). Mr. Mecham 
adamantly denied cooking meth, admitting to Brad Draper or the other officers that he knew the 
lab was there or that he knew what was in the lab equipment (T. 41-46) 
The jury convicted Mr. Darwin Mecham of Absconding, a Third Degree Felony and 
Possession of a Clandestine Laboratory, a First Degree Felony (T. 95-96). Mr. Mecham waived 
time for sentencing and was sentenced on both felonies concurrently but had them imposed 
consecutive to the sentence he was revoked upon (his prior felony conviction) (T. 98-101). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court committed plain error when it allowed the jury to view Mr. Mecham with 
handcuffs on in front of the jury. A defendant is entitled to be present in the courtroom with 
regular clothing-as opposed to a jail uniform-and to be without handcuffs. To do otherwise puts a 
picture of guilt in the minds of jurors and there is a strong likelihood that the jury was prejudiced. 
The trial attorney should have called for a mistrial after the jury viewed Mr. Mecham. As she 
failed to do that the trial Court should have known the error was fatal to the trial and declared a 
mistrial sua sponte, failure to do so was plain error. 
To succeed on a plain error argument, Mr. Mecham must show the error occurred, the 
error was obvious to the trial Court and that the error was harmful. Mr. Mecham admits that 
there is no written proof of the jury seeing him in handcuffs because his trial attorney and the trial 
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Court failed recognize the error and preserve the issue for appeal. However, Mr. Mecham wrote 
to the trial Court and informed them of the issue and that he planned to appeal the case on that 
basis. Although the trial attorney and/or the trial Court should have stopped the trial and declared 
a mistrial, this issue is still a viable one on appeal under the plain error doctrine. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT ALLOWED THE 
JURY TO VIEW MR MECHAM ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS IN HANDCUFFS. 
Mr. Mecham asserts that the jury viewed him in handcuffs during the jury trial on two 
separate occasions. This occurred despite the well-established rule that the defendant should be 
free from such prejudicial view by the jury. The trial Court was aware that the look of impropriety 
with guards around Mr. Mecham was problematic and told the prison guards that they could not 
stand right behind Mr. Mecham (T. 15). To avoid the view of handcuffs the trial Court attempted 
to prevent the problem by having Mr. Mecham led out after the jury was excused and brought in 
and seated prior to the jury arriving in the courtroom (T. 33). 
Mr. Mecham admits that no where in the trial court transcript does it indicate that the 
Court was made aware that he was seen in handcuffs by the jury. Additionally, no where on the 
record does it indicate that the defense attorney ask for a mistrial on the issue. However, Mr. 
Mecham asserts that he was seen on two occasions by the jury in handcuffs (T. 197-198). 
Mr. Mecham asserts to this Court that for the trial Court to fail to address the issue was 
plain error. When a claim is not preserved at the trial court level this Court can only review the 
matter if mistake is one of plain error-meaning it is so obvious that the Court should have 
discovered the problem and moved to address the issue sua sponte. Most recently in State v. 
Chatelain, P.3d (Utah Ct. App. 2001), the rule was reiterated, "To succeed on a claim of 
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plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing \I) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful."1 . quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993), See also State v. Helmick. 9 P.3d 164 (Utah 2000). 
Mr. Mecham must show that: (i) an error was made; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error was harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a 
more favorable outcome was reasonably likely. 
Mr. Mecham asserts that to let the jury see in him in handcuffs is similar to having the jury 
see him in jail or prison clothing and such a fatal error warrants reversal of his conviction. 
In State v. Bennett, 999 P.2d 1 (Utah 2000), The defendant asserted that his appearance in 
jail clothing violated his right to due process, "The prejudicial effect that flows from a defendant's 
appearing before a jury in identifiable prison garb is not measurable, and it is so potentially 
prejudicial as to create a substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a criminal trial." Id. We 
further held that "a trial judge should on his own initiative inquire of a defendant whether he 
wishes to waive his right not to appear in prison clothes so that the record affirmatively shows an 
intelligent and conscious waiver by the defendant if the defendant chooses to stand trial in prison 
clothes." Id. at 345." (Citations Omitted). 
Mr. Mecham asserts that handcuffs and the close proximity of the prison guard are similar 
to prison clothing. Handcuffs show that the defendant is in custody and give the same appearance 
to the jury. Even though Karen Allen did not raise and objection or preserve the matter on the 
record the trial Court should have known that the jury saw Mr. Mecham in handcuffs and the 
issue was a fatal one warranting reversal of the conviction. 
Why a trial Court should be concerned about the defendant being seen as "in custody" to a 
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jury is set forth in detail in Bennett: 
" First, the court was concerned that a defendant may be presumed by the jury to be guilty 
merely because the defendant appeared at trial in prison clothes, a result that undermines the 
fundamental principle that all persons are presumed innocent until proven guilty. See id. To 
support its concern that defendants may be presumed guilty because they appeared at trial in 
prison clothes, this court quoted Estelle, with approval, noting: 
"Courts have, with few exceptions, determined that an accused should not be compelled 
to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the presumption so 
basic to the adversary system. . . . This is a recognition that the constant reminder of the 
accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a juror's judgment. 
The defendant's clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence throughout the trial that . . an 
unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play." Chess, 617 P.2d at 
345 (quoting Estelle. 425 U.S. at 504-05). 
Second, the court was concerned that juries might base their verdicts on prejudice if the 
defendant appeared at trial in prison clothes, an outcome directly contradicting the fundamental 
principle "that cases should be decided on the facts, and not on prejudice, by whatever means the 
prejudice may insinuate itself" Id. In discussing this fundamental principle, Chess stated that "[a] 
decent respect for basic fairness and the indignity of appearing in a court of law in clothes which 
mark a defendant, who has not been convicted, as a lawbreaker would suggest" that "the 
occurrence of a defendant. . . standing trial before a jury in prison clothes should long ago have 
ceased." Id. "Indeed, we have numerous rules of evidence that prohibit the introduction of 
defendant's past criminal conduct solely to assure that a case will be decided on the facts untainted 
by past misconduct. . . . The potential effect on the minds of jurors in attempting to apply the 
presumption of innocence and the standards requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt to the 
evidence in a criminal case, require" that cases be decided on facts, not on prejudice. Id. 
Finally, we concluded in Chess that "[t]he prejudicial effect that flows from a defendant's 
appearing before a jury in identifiable prison garb is not measurable, and it is so potentially 
prejudicial as to create a substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a criminal trial" Id. at 344. 
Thus, to avoid the risk of fundamental unfairness in criminal trials evidenced by the possibilities 
that defendants may be presumed guilty and verdicts may be based upon prejudice, we held that 
trial courts should inquire of defendants appearing at trial in prison clothes whether they have 
intelligently and consciously waived their right not to so appear. See id. at 345. 
Mr. Mecham asserts that by witnessing him in handcuffs the prejudicial effect to the jury 
created a substantial risk that he was convicted of possession of the clandestine laboratory based 
on prejudice not on facts. He asserts that his presumption of innocence was lost when the jurors 
witnessed him in handcuffs. Although Karen Allen did not object on the record, such an issue 
should still be addressed by this Court. 
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As set forth above, the error is so significant that it is deemed plain error if the defense 
attorney or the trial Court does not raise the issue and address it in the trial. Being in handcuffs in 
front of the jury was or should have been an obvious problem to the trial judge. The Court was 
so careful about the prison guard not being right on top of Mr. Mecham during the trial that it 
was obvious the Court was aware to try to avoid the look of in-custody status. Once Mr. 
Mecham was seen the first time by the jury in handcuffs a mistrial should have been declared. 
However, the trial was not stopped, indeed the issue was not even addressed on the record. The 
jury was then allowed to see Mr. Mecham one additional time in handcuffs. 
Mr. Mecham submits that the error was prejudicial-harmful-to his case. As set forth 
above, Mr. Mecham asserts that there is no difference between being seen in handcuffs and being 
seen in jail attire. The impression is the same to the jury-this man is not innocent-he is in custody 
and therefore he has already been determined to have done wrong. Mr. Mecham was entitled to 
have the jury decide his guilt or innocence based on facts adduced at trial alone-not on his 
appearance in handcuffs. 
Based on the logic ofBennet there is no remedy for Mr. Mecham other than to reverse 
his conviction and remand the case to the trial Court for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Mecham asks this Court to vacate his conviction for a First Degree Felony on the 
basis that the jury saw him in hand cuffs and such a fatal error was obvious to the trial Court and 
warrants a reversal of his conviction. Mr. Mecham respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
conviction and remand for a new trial. 
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